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Abstract
Some recent empirical studies, motivated by Grossman and Helpman’s (1994)
”protection for sale” model, suggest that very few factors (none of them labor-
related) determine trade protection. This paper reexamines the roles that labor
issues play in the determination of trade policy. We introduce collective bargain-
ing, differences in labor mobility across industries, and trade union lobbying into
the protection-for-sale model and show that the equilibrium protection rate in our
model depends upon these labor market variables. In particular, our model pre-
dicts that trade protection is structurally higher than in the original protection-
for-sale model if the trade union of a sector lobbies but capital owners do not,
because union workers collect part of the protection rents; equilibrium protection
is lower if capital owners lobby but the trade union does not, because part of the
protection rents is dissipated to workers. Using data from U.S. manufacturing,
we find that collective bargaining, differences in labor mobility across industries,
and trade union lobbying indeed play important roles in the determination of U.S.
trade policy.
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1. Introduction
Lobbyists for trade and other industrial policies represent different interest groups in
society. In particular, distinguishing between labor and capital lobbies is common. Labor
interests, usually represented by trade unions, often lobby for trade protection. For example,
U.S. trade unions strongly opposed NAFTA in the 1990s because of fears that freer trade
would decrease domestic employment and wage levels. Further, according to Baldwin (1985)
and Baldwin and Magee (2000), trade union contributions are positively correlated with the
probability that a U.S. congressman votes against trade liberalization.
The “protection for sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994), however, suggests
that very few factors — none of them labor-related — determine trade protection. In the
protection-for-sale model, wages are fixed and equal across industries, and there is full
employment. Only capital owners are allowed to lobby for trade policy, but even if workers,
too, were allowed to lobby, they would want import subsidies in order to benefit from lower
product prices. Hence, the GH model cannot explain why trade unions lobby for trade
protection so as to secure higher wage and employment levels.
The GH model is also at odds with the older empirical trade protection literature
(Rodrik, 1995, provides an overview) that finds that labor market considerations are an
important trade policy determinant. However, more-recent empirical studies (for example,
Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000; Eicher and Osang, 2002)
find strong support for the protection-for-sale model. Some of these studies also test whether
labor market variables have additional explanatory power and find them to be statistically
insignificant.
This paper shows that we cannot infer from these results that labor market variables
are irrelevant for trade protection. The earlier papers that estimate the GH model employ
the nonlinear form of protection suggested by that model for estimation.1 But since the
GH model has nothing to say about labor market variables, the inclusion of these variables
in empirical studies thus far has been ad hoc. The main contribution of this paper is to
show that, once labor market variables have been appropriately controlled for, statistical
methods strongly reject the null hypothesis that labor market variables are irrelevant to
trade protection.
To this end, we construct a model in the same spirit as GH but relax assumptions
about the labor market. In particular, we allow for (1) industry-specific trade unions that
bargain with capital owners over union wages and employment, (2) differences in labor
mobility across industries, and (3) active lobbying by trade unions. Our model predicts
that trade protection is structurally higher than in the GH model if the trade union of
1For example, in the GH model, import protection decreases with import penetration ratio and import
demand elasticity when capital owners lobby, but it increases with these two variables when capital owners
do not lobby.
3an industry lobbies but capital owners do not, because union workers collect part of the
protection rents. However, equilibrium protection is lower if capital owners lobby but the
trade union does not, because workers receive part of the protection rents. Moreover, as long
as trade protection increases the wages of at least some non-unionized workers, equilibrium
protection is lower than in the GH model even if both the capital owners and the trade
union of an industry lobby. In contrast to the protection-for-sale model without trade
union activity, the equilibrium protection rate in our model depends upon sectoral wage
and employment elasticities that, in turn, vary according to the mobility of workers across
industries.
We test our model predictions using 1983 data from U.S. manufacturing. Since our
framework nests the GH model, we can test the statistical validity of the GH restrictions.
Our major finding is that we can reject the GH model in favor of our labor-augmented
model. Consistent with our theory, we find that, compared with the GH predictions, trade
protection is indeed higher when trade unions lobby and capital owners do not, but lower
when capital owners lobby. Not only does trade protection vary according to whether capi-
tal owners of an industry lobby, but it also depends on trade union activity and differences
in labor mobility across industries. Moreover, our labor-augmented model delivers con-
siderably lower estimates of the percentage of lobbies in the population and the weight of
contributions in the governmental welfare function, both of which had been found to be
unreasonably high in previous tests of the GH model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we derive the
equilibrium tariffs for industries with mobile and immobile labor when trade unions bargain
with firms over wages and employment and are also allowed to lobby for trade protection.
We present the econometric model and its predictions in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe
the data, and we proceed with estimation and testing in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6,
we conclude the paper and make suggestions for future research.
2. The Model
2.1. Model Basics. In the following, we augment the GH model to allow for labor market
considerations. Consider a small country with n + 1 industries, each producing a single
good. The country has fixed endowments of labor, L, and industry-specific capital, Ki,
where i = 1, . . . , n. Each worker (capital owner) inelastically supplies one unit of labor
(industry-specific capital).
On the consumption side, all individuals, h = 1, . . . , H, have identical quasilinear
preferences of the form Uh = xh0 +
∑n
i=1 u(x
h
i ), where x
h
i denotes h’s consumption of good
i and u is strictly concave and increasing in xhi . If each individual has enough income to
consume all goods, quasilinearity of preferences ensures that demand of a good i = 1, . . . , n
depends only on its own price.
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Let I = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of all industries. The numeraire industry,
i = 0, uses only labor for production according to F 0 = L0. The world price of good
0 is fixed at p¯0, and no trade barriers are imposed on it. Each non-numeraire industry,
i = 1, . . . , n, consists of two sectors — A, which is unionized, and B, which is non-unionized
— with identical production functions. Firms in these industries employ three production
factors: capital, labor, and the numeraire good 0 as an intermediate input.2 Each unit of the
final good i requires a fixed (but differing with i) amount of good 0 (Leontief technology).
To keep notation simple, we denote the price of the amount of good 0 required for one unit
of good i by qi and then write (pi − qi)F i(Ki, Li) as value added. Unlike the intermediate
good 0, capital and labor are substitutable in the production function. Capital employed
in the sectors of any non-numeraire industry — namely, KiA in the unionized sector A and
KiB = Ki − KiA in the non-unionized sector B — is immobile. In contrast, labor may
or may not be mobile across industries as discussed in the next paragraph. The reduced
production function F i(Ki, Li) is linearly homogeneous and weakly concave, where F iLL < 0,
F iKK < 0, and F
i
KL > 0.
3
We allow for differences in the interindustry mobility of labor. For simplicity, we
assume that non-union workers are either completely mobile between certain industries or
that they cannot exit their industry and workers from other industries cannot enter. If
industry i ∈ IM , its labor pool potentially consists of all laborers in the mobile subset of
industries. If we assume that 0 ∈ IM , the competitive wage must be wi = p¯0 for i ∈ IM .
Union workers may switch industries if i ∈ IM ; however, they cannot be employed in the
unionized sectors of industries other than i itself.4 If industry i ∈ II , where IM ∪ II = I
and IM ∩ II = ∅, industry i’s workers are immobile and can work only in industry i.
In the unionized sector A, the capital owners bargain with the i-specific trade union,
which has Ni members, over wages and employment.5 In the non-unionized sector B,
employment is chosen by firms. As is commonly observed in practice, union workers do not
2To keep the analysis focused on the influence of labor issues on trade protection, the modelling of
intermediate goods as inputs is kept as simple as possible. We introduce them only to take into account that
firms and unions bargain over value added, not the entire value of shipments. Without this adjustment, we
would substantially and systematically underestimate union bargaining strength.
3We omit the intermediate input as an argument in the production function. Because good 0 is a Leontief
input, we must adjust the amount of good 0 proportionally with F i when capital or labor inputs vary.
4This assumption maintains the de facto partial equilibrium structure of the GH model, which would be
destroyed if the industry-specific trade unions also had to take into account that their members might find
employment in unionized sectors elsewhere.
5Assuming bargaining over both wages and employment (efficient bargaining) restricts the effect of union-
firm bargaining to redistributive issues. Efficient bargaining seems a justifiable assumption because empirical
tests between this model and the competing right-to-manage model either have been inconclusive or have
produced (weak) evidence in favor of the efficient bargaining model (MaCurdy and Pencavel, 1986). Matschke
(2004) discusses how employing the right-to-manage model of union-firm bargaining alters these results.
5work exclusively in the unionized sector, and non-union workers are not confined to work
in the non-unionized sector. Employment of union workers in sector A is measured as a
fraction αi of the Ni union members, whereas the share of covered non-union workers in
the non-union worker labor pool for industry i is δiαi (where δi ≥ 0). The union wage paid
in sector A is denoted by w¯i.6 In sector B, the wage is equal either to p¯0 (if i ∈ IM ) or to
the wage that equates residual labor supply and labor demand (if i ∈ II).
In some of the industries (but not the numeraire industry 0), either capital owners
or the trade union or both are active lobbies that solicit trade protection from the domestic
government. In the first (lobbying) stage, each lobby offers the government a schedule that
lists its contributions as a function of the domestic price vector. The domestic price, p, may
differ from the world price, p∗, if the domestic government imposes a vector t of specific
import tariffs (or import subsidies) or export taxes (or export subsidies) at this stage. In the
second (production) stage, firms and unions take goods prices as given when they determine
wages and employment. If good i is an import good, ti > 0 (ti < 0) implies that an import
tariff (import subsidy) is imposed. In contrast, if good i is an export good, ti > 0 (ti < 0)
implies an export subsidy (export tax). To facilitate the description, we focus on import
goods when describing the determination of the equilibrium trade policy.
2.2. Second Stage: Employment and Wage Determination. To find the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium, we start with the production stage and then consider the lobbying
stage. At the production stage, we assume that firms maximize profits and that the union
maximizes the wage bill of union workers.
2.2.1. Industries with mobile labor. In sector B, the firms choose the number of workers
LiB such that the first-order condition of profit maximization,
(pi − qi)F iL(KiB, LiB) = p¯0, (2.1)
holds. The wage wi is predetermined by p¯0 so that LiB adjusts to ensure that (2.1) holds.
Any labor not employed in the non-numeraire industries is absorbed by industry 0.
We assume that in sector A firms and union bargain over wages and employment
jointly and split the surplus according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. If
bargaining is successful, the wage bill for union workers equals αiw¯iNi+ (1−αi)p¯0Ni, that
is, αiNi union workers work in sector A and receive union wage w¯i, and (1 − αi)Ni union
workers work for the competitive wage in any of the non-unionized sectors within IM . We
assume that if a worker is member of union Ni, he cannot receive a union wage in any
industry apart from i. If N¯ =
∑
i∈IM Ni, the profits that remain for capitalists in sector A
amount to ΠiA = (pi − qi)F i(KiA, αi[Ni + δi(LM − N¯)]) − w¯iαi[Ni + δi(LM − N¯)], where
6In section 2.2, we discuss how αi and w¯i are determined.
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LM denotes the total labor pool for all industries in IM and LM − N¯ is the pool of non-
union members within LM . If bargaining fails, all workers have to find employment in the
non-unionized sectors of the industries in IM , and the expected wage bill reduces to p¯0Ni.
If we assume that the union succeeds in interrupting production in sector A, profits drop
to zero. The generalized Nash bargaining solution thus maximizes
{αi(w¯i−p¯0)Ni}si{(pi−qi)F i(KiA, αi[Ni+δi(LM−N¯)])−w¯iαi[Ni+δi(LM−N¯)]}1−si , (2.2)
where si and 1− si denote the relative bargaining strength of industry i’s trade union and
industry i firms (both are assumed to be exogenously given). Maximizing (2.2) with respect
to αi and w¯i leads to two equations. The first equation,
(pi − qi)F iL(KiA, αi[Ni + δi(LM − N¯)]) = p¯0, (2.3)
which mirrors (2.1), says that production is efficient. The second equation,
w¯i = si
(pi − qi)F iA
LiA
+ (1− si)p¯0, (2.4)
describes how the union wage serves to distribute the bargaining surplus between the union
and the capital owners. It is straightforward to show the following comparative statics:
Proposition 2.1. If industry i ∈ IM , the competitive wage does not depend on pi (dwidpi = 0),
employment in the unionized sector is increasing in pi (dαidpi = −
αip¯0
(pi−qi)2LiAF iALL
> 0), and the
union wage weighted by the probability of a union worker’s receiving it is also increasing in
pi (
d(αiw¯i)
dpi
= siF
iA
Ni+δi(LM−N¯) + p¯0
dαi
dpi
> 0).
Proof. dwidpi = 0 by construction of the numeraire industry production structure. The other
results follow from comparative statics on (2.3) and (2.4). ¤
2.2.2. Industries with immobile labor. When labor is immobile between industries, equilib-
rium labor in sector B has to equal the residual labor supply of the industry Li − αi[Ni +
δi(Li − Ni)], that is, all labor not employed in sector A of i. Hence the competitive wage
must adjust. From profit maximization and labor market clearing, we have
(pi − qi)F iL(KiB, Li − αi[Ni + δi(Li −Ni)]) = wi. (2.5)
In sector A, firms and union split the surplus according to the generalized Nash
bargaining solution. If bargaining is successful, the wage bill for union workers equals
αiw¯iNi + (1 − αi)wiNi. The profits earned by capital owners in sector A equal ΠiA =
(pi − qi)F i(KiA, αi[Ni + δi(Li − Ni)]) − w¯iαi[Ni + δi(Li − Ni)]. If bargaining fails, all
workers must find employment in the non-unionized sector B of industry i, in which case
the wage bill reduces to wiNi, where wi = (pi − qi)F iL(KiB, Li). Moreover, the union
7succeeds in interrupting production in sector A, so that profits are zero. The generalized
Nash bargaining solution thus maximizes
{αiw¯iNi + (1− αi)wiNi − wiNi}si (2.6)
× {(pi − qi)F i(KiA, αi[Ni + δi(Li −Ni)])− w¯iαi[Ni + δi(Li −Ni)]}1−si .
Maximizing (2.6) with respect to αi and w¯i leads to two equations. The employment share
αi is determined by
F iAL = F
iB
L + (1− αi)[Ni + δi(Li −Ni)]F iBLL. (2.7)
This equation shows that if i ∈ II , the marginal product of labor across the sectors of i is
usually not equalized because unions and firms realize that the competitive wage depends
on their employment choice. Furthermore, (2.5) and (2.7) suggest that dαidpi = 0.
7 Therefore,
we find that, in contrast to the case of mobile labor, price changes are reflected solely in
wage changes when labor is immobile.8 The union wage is determined by
w¯i = si
(pi − qi)F iA
LiA
+ (1− si)wi − (1− αi)wi
αi
. (2.8)
Since wi > wi, the union wage is smaller than w¯i = si
(pi−qi)F iA
LiA
+ (1− si)wi. The following
comparative statics hold:
Proposition 2.2. If industry i ∈ II , employment in the sectors does not depend on pi
(dαidpi = 0), whereas union and competitive wages are both increasing in pi (
dw¯i
dpi
= w¯ipi−qi > 0,
dwi
dpi
= wipi−qi > 0).
Proof. The result follows from comparative statics on (2.5), (2.7), and (2.8). We showed
above that dαidpi = 0 solves (2.7); the results for the wage changes easily follow. ¤
2.3. First Stage: Lobbying. In this stage, trade union and capital owner lobbies present
the domestic government with menus that map all possible tariff vectors, t, into contri-
butions that a lobby would pay in case a certain t is chosen (common-agency model of
Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). The government takes these menus as given and chooses
the t that maximizes the weighted sum of total contributions and aggregate gross wel-
fare (that is, the sum of production value, tariff revenue, and consumer surplus), where the
weight on aggregate welfare is denoted by a and contributions receive weight 1. The equilib-
rium tariff vector t∗ is defined by the following conditions (Grossman and Helpman, 1994):
It maximizes the government’s utility function, and it maximizes the sum of governmental
utility and the utility of any lobby.
7This solution need not be unique, but without further assumptions about F iLL, the existence of other
solutions is not guaranteed.
8This finding assumes flexible wages. With inflexible wages, unemployment is likely (see Matschke, 2004).
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The common-agency framework in which lobbies confront the government with an in-
finite listing of tariff vectors and contributions attached to them clearly looks quite different
from real-world lobbying. Lobbies typically tell the government what protection they want
(or they provide selective information from which the government can infer these wishes).
The government then takes a weighted average of the wishes of the different lobbies and
its own ideas of what the optimal tariff would look like to determine the equilibrium tariff.
Matschke (2004) reconciles these two alternative views of lobbying. She defines the “uni-
laterally optimal tariff” as the tariff that a group would set (if it could do so) to maximize
its own welfare. Let tNji and t
Kj
i denote the unilaterally optimal tariffs of groups Nj and
Kj . Also, let tGi denote the domestic welfare-maximizing tariff. This is the tariff that the
government would set if no lobbies existed, and it can thus also be interpreted as a unilat-
erally optimal tariff. Matschke then shows that the equilibrium tariff for industry i in the
lobbying game can be written as the weighted average of the unilaterally optimal tariffs for
the different players of the lobbying game:
Lemma 2.1 (Matschke 2004). The equilibrium tariff for industry i is given by
t∗i =
atGi (t
∗
i )
a+Θ
+
∑
Kj∈Ω
θKj t
Kj
i (t
∗
i )
a+Θ
+
∑
Nj∈Ω
θNj t
Nj
i (t
∗
i )
a+Θ
, (2.9)
where θgj denotes the population share of group gj, Θ denotes the population share of all
lobbies, and Ω is the set of all lobbies.
Therefore, t∗i can be determined by first calculating the unilaterally optimal tariffs
and then using Lemma 2.1.9
2.4. Player Interests and the Equilibrium Tariff.
2.4.1. General results. To understand the players’ interests, we calculate their unilaterally
optimal tariffs first. The natural starting point is the welfare-maximizing tariff tGi , that
is, the tariff that the government would impose without lobby influence. The government
maximizes domestic welfare (omitting parts that do not depend on pi)WGi = (pi−qi)F iA+
(pi − qi)F iB + p¯0F 0 + (L+
∑n
k=1Kk)Vi + tiMi by choosing pi, where (L+
∑n
k=1Kk)Vi is
the consumer surplus from good i. If i ∈ IM , the government can use a tariff to increase
production in i (at the expense of production in the numeraire industry), but because the
marginal value added is the same across all industries, the government has no incentive to
do so. If i ∈ II , the marginal value added of labor is equal neither across industries nor
across sectors of an industry. However, employment is independent of the product price,
9Here, the t
gj
i are functions of t
∗
i . This does not diminish the usefulness of Lemma 2.1 because the
equilibrium tariff predictions in the original GH model are also given only as implicit functions where t∗i
appears on both sides of the equilibrium tariff equation.
9and therefore labor cannot be shifted to industries or sectors with higher marginal value
added. Hence, free trade is welfare-maximizing in both cases. Thus,
tGi = 0. (2.10)
For lobbies gj outside industry i, the desire to drive a wedge between the do-
mestic price and the world price for product i stems from two sources. First, as con-
sumers, the lobby wants as low a price as possible. Second, as a recipient of tariff rev-
enue, the lobby desires a strictly positive tariff. Formally, the lobby maximizes W gji =
θgj (L+
∑n
k=1Kk)Vi + θgj tiMi, where j 6= i. Maximizing W gji by choice of ti, we obtain
t
gj
i =
F i
M ′i
. (2.11)
Because consumer surplus considerations outweigh tariff revenue considerations, lobby gj
would like to impose an import subsidy on good i 6= j.
Finally, we consider the interests of lobby groups inside industry i. Capital owners
maximize the sum of profits, consumer surplus, and tariff revenue share, that is, WKii =
(pi−qi)F iA+(pi−qi)F iB−w¯iLiA−wiLiB+θKi (L+
∑n
k=1Kk)Vi+θKitiMi. The capitalists’
unilaterally optimal tariff is given by
tKii =
1
θKiM
′
i
[
−(1− θKi)F i + (w¯i − (pi − qi)F iAL )
dLiA
dpi
+ LiA
dw¯i
dpi
+ LiB
dwi
dpi
]
. (2.12)
We see that tKii consists of four components. The first component is also present in the
original GH model. Capital owners are interested in a positive tariff for their industry
because such a tariff increases sales revenues and leads to higher tariff revenues, but they
also take into account that they consume their own good. Thus tKii in the original GH model
would be − (1−θKi )F i
θKiM
′
i
. However, when labor market influences are present, the capital owners
realize that a higher tariff may lead to higher wages in sectors A and B and may distort
production toward the unionized sector A, where workers receive wages above the marginal
value added of labor. These influences decrease tKii .
The trade union of industry i maximizes the sum of the wage bill, consumer surplus,
and tariff revenue share accruing to union members, that is,WNii = αiw¯iNi+(1−αi)wiNi+
θNi (L+
∑n
k=1Kk)Vi + θNitiMi. The unilaterally optimal tariff for the trade union in
industry i is
tNii =
1
θNiM
′
i
[
θNiF
i − (w¯i − wi)Nidαi
dpi
− αiNidw¯i
dpi
− (1− αi)Nidwi
dpi
]
. (2.13)
In the original GH model, union workers, like all consumers who own no capital, desire
an import subsidy for good i because consumer interests more than offset tariff revenue
considerations. However, once we allow for labor market imperfections, three additional
components appear that may make the union of industry i prefer a positive import tariff
for its good. Not only may union workers obtain higher wages when the domestic price of
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good i increases, but more union workers may find employment in the unionized sector A,
where rents can be earned because w¯i > wi.
2.4.2. Tariff predictions when labor is mobile. To facilitate comparability with the expres-
sions given by Grossman and Helpman (1994), we rewrite the optimal tariff equation in
terms of the equivalent ad valorem tariff τ∗i . Notice that
τ∗i
1+τ∗i
= t
∗
i
pi
. Letting ei denote the
absolute value of the import demand elasticity, −M ′ipiMi , the following proposition results:
Proposition 2.3. If industry i ∈ IM , the equilibrium ad valorem tariff τ∗i of the lobbying
game is given by
τ∗i
1 + τ∗i
=

− ΘΘ+a F
i
eiMi
if nobody in i lobbies,
− ΘΘ+a F
i
eiMi
+ 1Θ+a
αiNi
LiA
si
F iA
eiMi
if only the union in i lobbies,
1−Θ
Θ+a
F i
eiMi
− 1Θ+asi F
iA
eiMi
if only capitalists in i lobby,
1−Θ
Θ+a
F i
eiMi
− 1Θ+a
(
1− αiNiLiA
)
si
F iA
eiMi
if all in i lobby.
Proof. Because wi = w0 = p¯0, the result follows from substituting (2.10)–(2.13) into
Lemma 2.1, using the expressions for dwidpi ,
dαi
dpi
, and d(αiw¯i)dpi from proposition 2.1. ¤
Not surprisingly, the equilibrium tariff equals the tariff of the original GH model when
nobody in industry i lobbies. When both the union and capital owners of industry i lobby,
the tariff would also be the same as in the original GH model if union wages were paid only
to union workers. This follows because efficient union wage bargaining then redistributes
income only between the two lobbies. However, as long as non-union workers, too, benefit
from higher union wages, protection benefits are dispersed from a lobby (the capital owners)
to a population group that does not lobby (the non-union workers), and therefore the
equilibrium tariff τ∗i will be structurally lower than in the GH model. Protection may be
even further reduced if capital owners decide that lobbying is not worthwhile since rent
dispersion to workers lowers the protection rents that they could capture. Finally, if one of
the two groups in industry i does not lobby, τ∗i in our model is distinct from τ
∗
i in the GH
model. The reason for this result lies in the profit sharing due to union wage bargaining.
If capital owners lobby, they take into account that they cannot capture all the protection
rents and are therefore less interested in tariff protection for their product. The resulting τ∗i
is hence lower by a dispersion component. If the trade union lobbies, τ∗i is now higher than
in the GH model by a collection component because part of the protection rents is captured
by the trade union, an active lobby. The discrepancy between the equilibrium tariffs found
here and in the GH model is higher the greater the share of unionized production in industry
i and the higher the bargaining strength of the trade union. Only if w¯i = wi (i.e., si = 0)
would the results match the predictions of the GH model.
2.4.3. Tariff predictions when labor is immobile. For industries with immobile labor, the
following equilibrium tariff structure emerges:
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Proposition 2.4. Let λi denote the labor force share in industry i which is covered by
collective bargaining (that is, rewrite LiA = λiLi and LiB = (1−λi)Li ). If industry i ∈ II ,
the equilibrium ad valorem tariff τ∗i of the lobbying game is given by
τ∗i
1 + τ∗i
=

− ΘΘ+a F
i
eiMi
if nobody in i lobbies,
− ΘΘ+a F
i
eiMi
+ 1Θ+a
αiw¯i+(1−αi)wi
ei(pi−qi)Mi Ni if only the union in i lobbies,
1−Θ
Θ+a
F i
eiMi
− 1Θ+a λiw¯i+(1−λi)wiei(pi−qi)Mi Li if only capitalists in i lobby,
1−Θ
Θ+a
F i
eiMi
− 1Θ+a αiδiw¯i+(1−αiδi)wiei(pi−qi)Mi (Li −Ni) if all in i lobby.
Proof. The result follows immediately from substituting (2.10)–(2.13) into Lemma 2.1,
using the expressions for dαidpi ,
dwi
dpi
, and dw¯idpi from proposition 2.2. ¤
If nobody in industry i lobbies, τ∗i will be the same as in the original GH model.
But the tariff structure differs as soon as industry i lobbies enter the scene. As with mobile
labor, the GH predictions are altered by a collection component if the trade union lobbies
and capital owners do not, and by a dispersion component if capital owners lobby and
the union does not. And just as with mobile labor, a dispersion component arises even if
both groups lobby. When labor is immobile, however, this dispersion component does not
disappear as δi goes to zero: Trade protection increases the wages paid to workers even if
no unionized sector exists. A higher tariff increases labor demand that meets completely
inelastic supply. The price increase is thus accompanied by an increase in the competitive
wage wi. This wage increase in turn means that workers in the non-unionized sector share in
the protection rents. Profit-sharing is even higher in the unionized sector because w¯i > wi.
The union interest in a higher wage partly counterbalances the dispersion effect when both
capital owners and the union lobby. The dispersion component is then caused only by wage
increases that go to non-union workers: Every non-union worker in i gets at least wi, and
αiδi(Li −Ni) non-union workers get even more because they are employed in sector A and
receive the higher union wage w¯i.
3. The Econometric Model
To write the equilibrium tariff equation to include both mobile and immobile labor,
we define the following indicator variables: ki takes the value 1 when capitalists in industry
i lobby (0 otherwise), ni equals 1 when trade unions in industry i lobby (0 otherwise), and
mi equals 1 when labor in industry i is mobile (0 otherwise).
Proposition 3.1. The equilibrium ad valorem tariff τ∗i for industry i is given by
τ∗i
1 + τ∗i
= − Θ
Θ+ a
F i
eiMi
+
1
Θ+ a
ki
F i
eiMi
+
1
Θ+ a
labvari, (3.1)
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where
labvari =

(1− ki)nimi αiNiLiA si F
iA
eiMi
− ki(1− ni)misi F iAeiMi − kinimi
(
1− αiNiLiA
)
si
F iA
eiMi
+(1− ki)ni(1−mi)αiw¯i+(1−αi)wi(pi−qi)eiMi Ni − ki(1− ni)(1−mi)
λiw¯i+(1−λi)wi
(pi−qi)eiMi Li
−kini(1−mi)αiδiw¯i+(1−αiδi)wi(pi−qi)eiMi (Li −Ni)
 .
Proof. Use ki, ni, and mi to collapse propositions 2.3 and 2.4 into one expression. ¤
The variable labvari is positive if the trade union of industry i lobbies but capital
owners do not, negative if capital owners in i lobby, and zero if nobody in i lobbies.
To obtain our main estimation equation, we start with proposition 3.1 and introduce
an additive error term εi, where E [εi] = 0 and E
[
ε2i
]
= σ2. Our estimation equation is thus
τ∗i
1 + τ∗i
= β0 + β1
F i
eiMi
+ β2ki
F i
eiMi
+ β3labvari + εi. (3.2)
According to our theory, β0 = 0, β1 = − ΘΘ+a , and β2 = β3 = 1Θ+a . A more parsimonious
specification results by letting β2 = β3, as the theory predicts:
τ∗i
1 + τ∗i
= β0 + β1
F i
eiMi
+ β2
(
ki
F i
eiMi
+ labvari
)
+ εi. (3.3)
This stricter interpretation of our model in (3.3) facilitates the analysis of the structural
parameters a and Θ since over-identification of a and Θ in (3.2) leads to two (potentially
very different) estimates per parameter.
4. The Data
Following earlier literature, we limit our analysis to manufacturing industries in
the U.S. during 1983. The time period and industry range are the same as those used
in the studies by Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), and
Eicher and Osang (2002), who all found that the basic GH model without labor market
influences predicts U.S. trade policy well. This data set has the major advantage of letting
us directly investigate whether model misspecification is responsible for the finding that the
introduction of extraneous labor market variables does not improve the empirical model
fit. On the downside, 1983 was a recession year in the United States and therefore may
be unrepresentative of the link between economic data and U.S. trade policy over a longer
period. On the other hand, the fact that the early 1980s were marked by a deep recession
may help explain why the protection-for-sale model has been found to work well for 1983
U.S. data – the government being more sympathetic towards lobbies suffering from the
economic crisis. But since the question we focus on is whether we can improve upon the
performance of the basic GH model with our labor market augmentation, data availability
and comparability with the above-mentioned earlier studies encourage the use of the 1983
data set.
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To test our labor-augmented model, we need additional data compared with previous
studies. We extract information about wages and unionization from the 1983 Current
Population Survey (CPS). These data are given at the 3-digit CIC level but are concorded
into 4-digit SIC. We keep the data set at the 4-digit SIC level to retain as much information
as possible. Whenever variables are available only at the 3-digit or even 2-digit level,
they are simply replicated for all 4-digit SIC codes within the corresponding 3-digit (or
2-digit) classification,10 following the study by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). After
deleting industries for which our data set was incomplete, we are left with 194 observations.
Descriptive statistics and units of measurement for key variables are provided in table 1.
Like the earlier empirical studies, we employ non-tariff barrier (NTB) coverage ratios
as a measure for trade barriers.11 While the use of NTBs in the protection-for-sale model
is problematic (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 2000), U.S. tariffs in 1983 were determined by
multilateral (GATT) tariff negotiations, whereas the protection-for-sale model assumes that
a country has the power to set tariffs unilaterally, precluding the use of tariff data.
The import demand elasticity is included as a component of the right-hand side vari-
ables, but our results are not very sensitive to this choice (see Section 5.3).12 Apart from
wages, unionization, and coverage measures, the explanatory variables in the trade protec-
tion equation are the import penetration ratio and indicator variables for union and capital
owner lobbying and labor mobility. The import penetration ratio is defined as value of gross
imports divided by the value of shipments.13 To correct for the existence of intermediate
inputs, we also use value added to substitute for (pi − qi)F i. As in Goldberg and Maggi
(1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), estimates of who is organized as a lobby
are based on political action committee (PAC) contributions data for congressional elections
1977-78, 1979-80, 1981-82, and 1983-84 (Gawande, 1995). Diverging from previous tests of
the protection-for-sale model, however, we use separate data for corporate PAC contribu-
tions and labor PAC contributions (for a description, see Gawande, 1995) to distinguish
between firm and union lobby groups. The corporate PAC contributions are available at
the 3-digit SIC level, the labor PAC contributions at the 2-digit level. To determine whether
the capital owners of an industry lobby for trade protection, we modify the procedure in
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000): We regress corporate contributions multiplied by the
inverse import penetration ratio and divided by profits against the set of 2-digit SIC dum-
mies. Industries with coefficient estimates above the mean coefficient estimate are assumed
to have an active capital owner lobby. Similarly, to determine whether trade unions in an
10We account for clustering at the 3-digit SIC level in the estimation.
11Gawande and Trefler provided these data.
12Gawande provided the import demand elasticities. The original source for these elasticities is Shiells,
Stern, and Deardorff (1986), who based their estimates on import demand data for 1962-78. The correction
procedure to account for these variables being generated regressors is described in Gawande (1997).
13These series come from the NBER trade and immigration database.
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industry lobby for trade protection, we regress trade union contributions multiplied by the
inverse import penetration ratio and divided by union wage bills against the set of 2-digit
SIC dummies. Industries with coefficient estimates above the mean coefficient estimate are
assumed to have an active trade union lobby. In our sensitivity analysis, we experiment
with alternative ways of determining who lobbies.
To obtain the remaining variables, we employ CPS data from 1983.14 One important
aspect of these data is the percentage of union workers. In the sample of manufacturing
industries, 27.9% of workers were union members in 1983. Unionization varies widely across
industries, with percentages between 0 and nearly 100. Equally important for our model is
the question of how many workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements. Unfor-
tunately, a major problem with the CPS data is that, after workers in the outgoing rotation
groups were asked whether they were union members, only those workers who answered
“no” were then asked whether they were covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The
BLS assumed that union workers were covered. For this reason, the BLS’s reported coverage
ratios have always exceeded actual unionization rates. In fact, according to newer infor-
mation obtained from the BLS, when union workers were asked in 2001 whether they were
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, only 85% of union workers answered “yes.”
It seems reasonable to assume that union workers who did not work at the time of the CPS
survey were not covered by a collective bargaining agreement. When this assumption is
made, we find that 7.8% of the union workers are not covered. This number can be viewed
as a lower bound on the percentage of uncovered union workers because at any time there
are also union workers employed in firms that are not yet subject to collective bargaining.
Union and non-union wages for the different industries are calculated using hourly wage
data from the CPS, adjusted for worker characteristics. These hourly wages are then ad-
justed by multiplying by annual work time to obtain an annual wage bill per worker. To
calculate the union bargaining strength si, we use si = w¯i−wi(pi−qi)FiA
LiA
−wi
from (2.4).15
We experiment with several approaches to decide which industries have mobile labor.
We could write down the equilibrium tariff equation without deciding which industries have
mobile or immobile labor, but then we would need sound estimates of wage and employment
elasticities in the unionized and non-unionized sectors for the different industries. Because
we do not have such estimates, we adopt the approach of sorting industries into mobile
and immobile classes, but we perform extensive sensitivity analysis to account for the arbi-
trariness of such sorting. In our basic specification, we identify mobile industries based on
industry unemployment rates—an industry is considered mobile if the unemployment rate
14From the NBER data disk “Current Population Survey: Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups 1979-2001.”
15In practice, si need not always lie between 0 and 1 when calculated this way. We therefore rescale si
to impose this condition.
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does not exceed 10%. In our sensitivity analysis, we explore alternative methods of defining
mobile industries.
Table 2 reports means for several key variables across our capitalist lobby, trade union
lobby, and labor mobility classifications. The main result is that trade protection ( τ
∗
i
1+τ∗i
)
depends not only upon our measure of capitalist lobby activity and the import penetration
ratio, but also upon our measures of trade union activity and labor mobility.
As with the earlier empirical studies, we use the same instruments for the endogenous
variables, plus the capital-labor ratio, the relative bargaining strength of the trade union,
and industry fixed effects. The instruments include factor shares (defined as factor revenues
divided by production value) for physical capital, inventories, engineers and scientists, white-
collar labor, skilled labor, semiskilled labor, cropland, pasture, forest, coal, petroleum, and
minerals, as well as seller concentration, seller number of firms, buyer concentration, buyer
number of firms, scale, capital stock, unionization, geographic concentration, and tenure
(see Trefler, 1993).
5. Estimating and Testing the Model
5.1. Methodology. We estimate and compare the GH specification, i.e., (3.2) with β3 = 0,
to the labor-augmented full specification (3.2) and the labor-augmented short specification
(3.3). Several complications arise in estimating the econometric model. First, our measure
of trade protection is censored, requiring the use of limited dependent variable methods.
Second, components of the explanatory variables are endogenously determined, thereby
suggesting that we implement instrumental variables techniques. So we use the approach of
Smith and Blundell (1986) to estimate a Tobit model with endogenous explanatory variables
(Wooldridge, 2001, provides a discussion). Last, certain components of our explanatory
variables (ki, ni, and mi) are constructed. We therefore explore the sensitivity of our
results to different variable formulations.
The first step in implementing the Smith and Blundell approach is to estimate the
residuals from the instrumental variable equations. Letting zi denote the column vec-
tor of instruments and xi the column vector of (endogenous) explanatory variables for
industry i, the estimated residuals are given by vˆ′i = x
′
i − z′iΠˆ, with Πˆ = (Z ′Z)−1Z ′X
(equation-by-equation OLS). The second step then involves estimating the Tobit model
τ∗i
1+τ∗i
= max {0, x′iβ + vˆ′iγ + ε∗i } with the estimated residuals as additional explanatory vari-
ables. We then need to adjust the usual Tobit variance-covariance matrix for the first-stage
estimation (see Smith and Blundell, 1986, and Amemiya, 1979, for the exact form). If γ 6= 0
(where the test of weak exogeneity uses the unadjusted Tobit variance-covariance matrix),
we can reject the null hypothesis of weakly exogenous xi’s.
Various studies suggest that the import penetration ratio in our model is an en-
dogenous variable. That is, not only does import penetration affect trade protection, but
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trade protection in turn influences import penetration, higher trade protection leading to
lower import penetration. Furthermore, capitalist and union lobbying are endogenously
determined in the model. Wages, employment, and trade protection per industry are in-
trinsically linked and thus endogenous. We therefore treat each of our explanatory variables
as endogenous.16 Our instruments do a decent job of explaining variation in our endogenous
explanatory variables.17
5.2. Results. Parameter estimates are reported in table 3. As shown, our labor market
variable is indeed an important determinant of trade protection. We reject the null hypoth-
esis that the labor market has no effect on trade protection (β3 = γ3 = 0), as evidenced
by a Wald test score (p-value) of 8.95 (.0114). Hence, our estimation results favor the
labor-augmented model, and so labor immobility issues and trade union lobbying indeed
seem to influence trade policy. Also, as table 1 shows, the redistributive labor market vari-
able can be quite sizable. Interestingly, the average labor market component in the sample
is negative, so that (with fixed coefficients) accounting for trade union activity and labor
immobility reduces the average in-sample tariff prediction.
Further, we fail to reject the null that β2 = β3 and γ2 = γ3 with a Wald test
statistic of 1.58 (.4540). Thus, we cannot reject the short specification in favor of the full
specification. For all three specifications, β1 < 0 and β2 > 0 to statistically significant
degrees, and β0 = 0 cannot be rejected, all of which is in accordance with our theory. All
three models explain a significant portion of the variance in our trade protection measure
because Wald tests reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero, that is, β = 0.
We also reject the null hypotheses of weakly exogenous explanatory variables (γ = 0) and
β1+β2 = 0 in the labor-augmented specifications, in contrast to the basic GH specification.
Under the GH specification, we estimate the structural parameters, Θ and a, to
be 1.07 and 388. These estimates compare to estimates of 0.66 and 325 under the short
specification (and 0.75-1.05 and 309-434 in the full specification). We cannot reject the
null hypotheses that Θ ∈ [0, 1] and a ≥ 0 at any standard significance level.18 Thus,
the government places much more weight on gross social welfare — around 99.7% of total
weight — than on political contributions. Still, our estimate of the weight on contributions
in the domestic welfare function is higher than that found in the GH specification. Also,
we estimate the percentage of the population that actively lobbies to be about 66%, which
is much lower and thus more realistic than in the basic GH specification which is subject
16Contrary to the approach of Goldberg and Maggi (1999), we treat entire explanatory variables as
endogenous, not just components of the explanatory variables. In other words, we treat F
i
Mi
, ki
F i
Mi
, and
labvari as endogenous, instead of
F i
Mi
, ki, mi, ni, etc. In fact, in the 2SLS framework, one can show that a
nonlinear function of fitted values is not the same as fitted values of a nonlinear function.
17First-stage R2 values range around 0.35, so that we reject the null of weak instruments.
18Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method.
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to omitted variable bias. Most likely, our structural parameter estimates are still too high,
but the labor augmentation has brought the estimates down considerably. Together with
the fact that all the estimated coefficients have the correct signs and are significant, our
results provide strong support for the labor-augmented protection-for-sale model.
5.3. Sensitivity Analysis. In table 4, we consider several alternatives to the variable
formulations used in table 3. We report results for the short specification only, but also
provide Wald test results of the restrictions implied by the GH and short specifications.
Overall, we find that our estimates are quite robust to these alternatives.
We first consider alternatives to our unemployment-based labor mobility indicator
variable – mobility observed from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), mobility
based on average worker tenure, complete labor immobility in all industries, and complete
labor mobility in all industries.19 For mobility based on the 1983 PSID, we treat any house-
hold that reports changing jobs and occupations as mobile. Alternatively, any household
that reports changing jobs but not occupations or reports keeping the same job is treated
as immobile.20 An industry is then classified as mobile if at least 40% of its workers are
mobile. As a second measure using the PSID, we compare industry classifications from
1983 to 1984. Household heads and spouses who report changing industries are considered
mobile; those who report no change are treated as immobile. An industry is then considered
mobile if at least 40% of its workers are mobile. We also define an alternative labor mo-
bility measure based on average worker tenure in an industry. If average tenure is 5 years
or less, we classify labor of an industry as mobile. In each alternative specification, the
parameter estimates obtain the correct (statistically significant) signs. We generally reject
the GH restriction and fail to reject the restriction imposed by the short specification, and
the estimates of the structural parameters Θ and a are lower than in the GH specification
reported in table 3.
Next, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the definition of active capitalist
lobbying. We consider two alternatives to our regression-based approach: the industry orga-
nization indicator from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and the politically organized
indicator from Goldberg and Maggi (1999). The GB and GM formulations, however, yield
different results. The parameter estimates for the GB specification are generally statisti-
cally insignificant. Under the GM specification, however, we observe statistically significant
parameter estimates, the same patterns with the structural parameter estimates (they are
19We also considered mobility based on inter-industry wage differentials and different industry unem-
ployment rates and average worker ages. These results, not reported here, are similar to those in table
4.
20The PSID collects this information only when a household head enters the sample. The response is
then carried forward with no updating as long as the household head remains in the sample.
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smaller under the labor-augmented specification than under the GH specification), and we
can reject the GH restrictions while failing to reject the short restrictions.
We also explore an alternative definition for active trade union lobbying, based on
labor compared to corporate contributions, as well as the extreme cases of union lobbies
in no and all industries.21 Again, the parameter estimates have the correct (statistically
significant) signs. In each case, we reject the restriction imposed by the GH model and fail
to reject the restriction implied by the short specification. Moreover, the estimates of Θ
and a are close to our original results.
In the last column of table 4, we compare our estimation results with results using
Gawande’s corrected import demand elasticities on the left-hand side of the estimating
equation. The parameter estimates for β1 and β2 have the right signs and are significant.
We reject the GH specification and cannot reject the short specification in favor of the full
specification, and the structural parameter estimates take on values similar to those already
reported.
As a last robustness check not reported in table 4, we employ the 3-digit SIC data
set of Eicher and Osang (2002) and the GM capital lobby indicators and supplement this
data set by 3-digit SIC aggregated labor market variables. As in the 4-digit SIC analysis,
the results are broadly supportive of the labor-augmented model. All coefficient estimates
have the right signs. The lobby percentage is estimated at 72% and the weight on domestic
welfare at 355, both lower than in the simple GH specification. The evidence for the labor-
augmented model is somewhat weaker in the 3-digit SIC aggregation, however, in that we
can only reject the GH specification at the 15% level of significance.
Overall, our estimation results are quite robust to the choice of labor mobility mea-
sure and capitalist and trade union lobby measures. We also show that our results are
relatively insensitive to how the import demand elasticity is treated in estimation.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we show how trade union lobbying, collective bargaining, and differ-
ences in labor mobility across industries can be incorporated into the protection-for-sale
model in a theoretically consistent manner to generate empirically verifiable implications.
We demonstrate that, for tests of the importance of variables beyond the ones in the basic
protection-for-sale model, previous empirical studies suffer from model misspecification.
21We also considered active trade union lobbying based on industry unionization rates and labor contri-
butions relative to value added, wage bills, and number of union workers — yielding qualitatively similar
results.
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We show that trade union activity leads to a redistribution of protection rents be-
tween capital owners, union workers, and non-union workers which introduces labor mar-
ket variables into the equilibrium tariff equation. We test the predictions of our labor-
augmented model against the GH model using the same 1983 manufacturing data set,
which has been used extensively in the literature to test the protection-for-sale model, and
find that labor market variables have a significant impact on trade policy once they have
been appropriately controlled for. Moreover, we find that the estimated structural param-
eters of the protection-for-sale model (percentage of population represented by lobbies and
weight on domestic welfare in the governmental welfare function) are lower and thus more
realistic than in the GH model, although they probably still lie above their true values.
Additional augmentations of the GH model may be needed to arrive at more realistic esti-
mates. Ultimately, this caveat aside, we find that trade union activity and labor mobility,
in addition to the import penetration ratio, import demand elasticity, and capitalist lobby
activity, indeed play important roles in the determination of trade policy.
Several important extensions of our work seem noteworthy. First, an application
using more-recent data would be interesting. Second, a theoretical underpinning mapping
political contributions to trade union and capitalist lobby activity would be useful. Third,
good estimates of wage and employment elasticities would eliminate the need to define
mobile and immobile industries. Last, our model seems particularly well suited to those
countries outside the United States for which collective bargaining, trade union lobbying,
and labor immobility are significant issues.
20 XENIA MATSCHKE AND SHANE M. SHERLUND
Appendix A. Tables
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Unit Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
τ∗i ratio 0.11 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00
τ∗i
1+τ∗i
none 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.50
F i
Mi
none 92.48 14.51 552.38 0.11 7,521.42
ki
F i
Mi
none 76.59 0.00 553.29 0.00 7,521.42
labvari none -20.18 0.00 197.76 -2,735.85 13.76
Annual w¯i $1,000 18.44 18.44 2.17 13.21 23.86
Annual wi $1,000 16.74 16.93 1.71 12.98 22.32
Import demand elasticity absolute value 1.47 1.57 0.37 0.55 2.13
Imports $100 million 5.57 1.67 15.95 0.00 174.83
Shipments $100 million 52.58 24.14 142.66 0.73 1,825.92
Union shipments $100 million 22.25 7.59 69.88 0.06 860.56
Value added $100 million 21.24 11.14 31.61 0.52 215.93
Labor force thousands 38.49 21.10 54.54 1.30 486.00
Covered percent of union 92.00 91.34 4.00 75.93 100.00
Covered percent of nonunion 3.72 3.46 2.24 0.00 11.54
Covered percent of total 28.34 25.52 10.67 6.59 60.09
Unionized percent 28.20 24.82 11.54 6.69 65.23
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Table 3. Estimation Results
Parameter GH Specification Full Specification Short Specification
β0 .0250 .0109 .0045
(.0213) (.0223) (.0206)
β1 -.0028 -.0024 -.0020
(.0010) (.0009) (.0007)
β2 .0026 .0032 —
(.0010) (.0010)
β3 — .0023 —
(.0013)
β2 = β3 — — .0031
(.0010)
γ1 .0026 .0023 .0029
(.0016) (.0015) (.0008)
γ2 -.0025 -.0042 —
(.0016) (.0016)
γ3 — -.0048 —
(.0017)
γ2 = γ3 — — -.0048
(.0014)
σ2 .0442 .0413 .0417
(.0069) (.0064) (.0065)
Θ 1.0700 .75041.0534 .6563
(.0874) ( .1549.7750 ) (.0801)
a 387.95 308.91433.60 325.03
(146.27) ( 98.68251.83 ) (103.60)
GH — 8.95 —
[.0114]
Short — 1.58 —
[.4540]
β1 + β2 = 0 -0.86 1.48 2.49
{.8058} {.0709} {.0068}
β1 + β3 = 0 — -0.07 —
{.5284}
β = 0 8.31 11.23 9.90
[.0157] [.0105] [.0071]
γ = 0 3.68 12.03 13.30
[.1589] [.0073] [.0013]
lnL -47.99 -43.30 -44.12
# ki 72
# ni 66
# mi 56
Standard errors in parentheses; p-values from Wald tests in brackets; p-values from one-sided t-tests in braces.
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